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A B S T R A C T
This study focuses on imagined futures of personal mobility in the United Kingdom in the context of the need to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from transport. Focusing on two innovations, electric vehicles and car clubs, the
study investigates how people, behaviour and mobility are imagined in a range of visioning documents about the
future up to 2050, a timeline that is critically important for emission reduction targets. We ﬁnd that people are
imagined primarily as consumers in line with the rational actor paradigm, with many visions focusing on low-
carbon vehicles as a sustainability solution. This simple technological substitution vision does not play to the
strengths of electric vehicles, and diminishes their transformative potential. There are fewer car club visions; these
show less car ownership, but retain high mobility and an economic growth perspective. Our ﬁndings support the
idea that much future mobility visioning is used to support the status quo, rather than to explore a variety of
futures with diverse portrayal of people, behaviour and mobility.
1. Introduction
How personal mobility is imagined is an important and topical
debate, tying into discussions about greenhouse gas emissions and sus-
tainable development, as well as technological innovation, economic
growth and energy security. Growing pressures over road transport's
contribution to anthropogenic climate change are compounded by con-
cerns over air pollution and road congestion.
In the United Kingdom (UK), cars became the dominant mode of
travel in most people's lives after World War II. Practices, landscapes,
institutions, knowledge and cultural representations centred on the pri-
vately owned car, collectively making up automobility (Sheller and Urry,
2000; Schwanen, 2015a), came to dominate surface transport. However,
since 1990 the use and private ownership of the car have stabilized and
even declined, particularly among younger generations and in cities
(Goodwin and Van Dender, 2013). How signiﬁcant this ‘peak car’ phe-
nomenon will be in the long term is not yet clear. On the one hand,
systemic change is difﬁcult to achieve because numerous path de-
pendencies in terms of land use, policy, ﬁnance, expert knowledge, and
people's practices and emotions trap the UK (and the Global North more
generally) into continued reliance on the private car (Schwanen, 2016).
On the other, there are a range of innovations that could reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and that may durably reconﬁgure automo-
bility, driving a systemic shift towardsmore environmentally and socially
sustainable mobility in the future. Examples include technological in-
novations such as alternative power trains, including battery electric
vehicles and plug-in hybrids, hydrogen vehicles and biofuels, all with the
potential to greatly reduce fossil fuel use.
Other key innovations are social and institutional in nature and relate
to, for instance, product-to-services shifts and the integration of infor-
mation technology into mobility. At the intersection of the last two sit
various forms of car sharing, including car clubs – short-term, member-
ship-based rentals provided by a for-proﬁt ﬁrm or not-for-proﬁt organi-
sation. Analysis suggests moving towards sustainable personal transport
requires a combined strategy of technological improvements and demand
side management, such as addressing transport mode usage, trip length
and trip generation, although such a package is often seen as politically
challenging (Potter, 2007; Marsden et al., 2014).
With many potential innovations and cultural shifts, visions about the
future of personal mobility are very much dependent on normative as-
sumptions about modal choice. While there are many studies about how
new powertrains and other innovations might diffuse under a range of
economic and institutional conditions (e.g., Shepherd et al., 2012; Straw
and Rowney, 2013), there are far fewer that critically reﬂect on how
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visions about the future of personal mobility are constructed and how
users are imagined. Here “users” are those individuals who use a car as
driver or passenger to satisfy their transport needs. The term is closely
related to “consumers” but not identical; the latter is used in this paper to
denote users when they purchase goods and services, such as vehicles or
access to a car provided by a car club, in a market setting.
A relevant exception to the trend of downplaying the role of users is a
recent study (Ryghaug and Toftaker, 2016) that examines how users are
imagined in visions about the future of electric vehicles (EVs), con-
structed by a range of stakeholders from the car industry and government
in Norway. The study found that stakeholders loosely divided people into
groups by the likelihood or timing of EV adoption, and emphasized
‘learning-by-doing’, for example leasing an EV to convince potential
users to buy one. Consumers were generally portrayed as rational actors
concerned with cost; however, early adopters were considered to be of
the most interest, and were portrayed as environmentalists, idealists and
enthusiasts who were less concerned with cost and performance. This
exercise offers insight into the imagining of (potential) users as con-
sumers segmented by if, when and how they might be persuaded to
purchase and use an EV. It follows the common practice in the literature
on innovation diffusion inspired by Rogers (1995) to identify segments of
imagined users in a sequential manner, from ‘innovators’ and ‘early
adopter’, through early and late majority to ‘laggards’. Most diffusion
literature, however, does not explore how such frames or categories came
to be cognitively constructed, nor does it tend to adequately capture the
complexities of energy and climate choices (Stern et al., 2016).
Our study complements and extends the above work by critically
examining how future visions of personal mobility are constructed. By
investigating future-exploring documents by diverse and different
stakeholders, it aims to identify how the future is imagined in terms of
people, behaviour and personal mobility. The study is mostly descriptive
in nature, seeking to portray the expectations and often unstated as-
sumptions articulated in the examined documents. However, it is also
inevitably normative in places, for instance when it assesses the observed
portrayals. Different types of documents are identiﬁed in the literature,
such as forecasts, which extrapolate from current trends; pathways,
which look at possible routes to a (desirable) endpoint; and visions, or
explicitly normative elaborations of desirable futures (e.g., Mcdowall and
Eames, 2006).
In this paper, we take the position that all imagined futures are
normative, as they inevitably make assumptions about the future in terms
of behaviour, technological and economic development, and more. Even
documents which intentionally focus on plausible futures tend, for the
most part, to choose futures with assumptions that incumbent stake-
holders consider desirable, such as continued high use of private vehi-
cles; less desirable or (politically) more difﬁcult futures with reduced car
use are ignored or portrayed as implausible. The line between plausibility
and desirability, in other words, is rhetorically porous. We therefore
consider dichotomies between ‘plausible’ and ‘desirable’ futures less
useful, and refer to all imagined futures as visions, and all the documents
we study as visioning documents. Many of the documents contain different
scenarios, i.e., narratives of trajectories in the future following speciﬁc
assumptions about policies, prices, technological advances or other
events. Scenarios can include projections, quantitative predictions about
the future, e.g., in terms of EV numbers on the road or their percentage
among private vehicles.
Given the current dominance of automobility, the study focuses on
two innovations in private car technology, ownership and use: EVs and
car clubs. EVs are arguably the automotive industry's ‘winner’ in the low-
carbon vehicle technological innovation race (Bakker and Farla, 2015;
Sovacool, 2017), and are prominently featured in the UK Government's
new Industrial Strategy Green Paper (HMG, 2017). They offer
technology-driven reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, whilst poten-
tially continuing the dominance of private vehicle ownership. In contrast,
car clubs are a fairly successful niche, with nearly 200,000 users, mostly
in London (Steer Davies Gleave, 2015), that challenges some of the basic
assumptions of automobility by severing the link between functionality
and ownership. They offer a cultural and behavioural shift that poten-
tially forms part of an emerging mobility services paradigm.
Between these two innovations, both technological improvements
and the more challenging management of demand are considered; they
are qualitatively different in institutional make up, drivers, and percep-
tions, allowing for a broader, more informative investigation of how
future (more sustainable) mobility systems are imagined. These speciﬁc
innovations are clearly distinct from recent developments in public
transport, cycling and ‘smart’ mobility (including connected and auton-
omous vehicles). However, given that both (hybrid) EVs and car clubs
have been around as alternatives to the still hugely popular, individually
owned ICEV (internal combustion engine vehicle) for more than a
decade, they are also cases from which wider lessons about the re-
lationships between visioning and innovation in personal mobility can be
drawn. We note, however, that we found far fewer documents focusing
on car clubs, which also reﬂects a lacuna within UK research on transport
by academics and researchers in non-university settings alike. While our
original intention was to use the two equally in our research, we made
EVs our main case study, using car clubs as a counterpoint to highlight
implicit and explicit assumptions about transport futures.
We have chosen to investigate the UK for multiple reasons. Prag-
matically, it was where the project's research team are based and funded.
But beyond that, the UK is the sixth largest economy in the world (Giles,
2016), and is in the top ﬁfteen in terms of national CO2 emissions (Boden
et al., 2015). The UK is also in need of more efﬁcient, low-carbon
transport systems, given that transport accounts for roughly 25% of na-
tional CO2 emissions, approximately 2/3 of which comes from cars and
vans (CCC, 2014). Focusing on the UK is also useful due to several dif-
ferences in automobility and transport policy between it and other
North-West European countries, including Germany, France, the
Netherlands and Denmark. For instance, national government remained
longer committed to road building (until well in the 1990s) and priva-
tisation and deregulation have affected (public) transport to a greater
extent than countries on the continent (Shaw and Docherty, 2013). In
addition, despite devolution and localism, central government (the
Department for Transport and the Treasury) remain very inﬂuential in
transport policy in large parts of the UK, especially outside London and
Scotland (Mackinnon et al., 2010; Mackinnon, 2015; Schwanen, 2015b).
Lastly, while studies like Levidow and Papaioannou (2013) suggest the
importance of visions and imaginaries for innovation processes in per-
sonal transport, there have so far not been any studies that have sys-
tematically analysed visions on future mobility in the UK.
We turn next to look at the importance of visions and imaginaries, and
how they frame users, before detailing our own research design, then
move on to results and analysis and a ﬁnal discussion.
2. Background
2.1. Visions and imaginaries
In innovation studies there is now a well-established literature on
visions of the future highlighting their generative potential. Visions, and
the expectations they articulate, can motivate engineers and designers to
initiate projects (Van Lente, 1993), be used to attract ﬁnancial support for
research and innovation (Fujimura, 2003), and raise interest from a
wider range of stakeholders into a particular innovation, and thereby
increase the legitimacy and uptake of innovations (Schot and Geels,
2008; Geels and Verhees, 2011). In fact, Ruef and Markard (2010) have
argued that actors associated with a particular innovation might strate-
gically inﬂate expectations or technological promise to attract resources
and attention. This over-optimism can lead to a period of hype, during
which attention (from media and the public) and expectations peak.
Rather than being some latent or unintended side effect, visions and
expectations are a key part of the process of technological innovation
(Van Lente and Rip, 1998, Brown et al., 2000; Borup et al., 2006;
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Hultman, 2009; Sovacool and Brossmann, 2014).
Future visions can also become accepted so widely that they start to
function as ‘sociotechnical imaginaries’ or “collectively held, institu-
tionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures,
animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order
attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technol-
ogy” (Jasanoff, 2015, p. 6). Sociotechnical imaginaries evolve over time
and also compete with each other, and they can affect innovation pro-
cesses, not at the level of individual projects and initiatives, but at the
more aggregated level of an innovation pathway. For example, in a study
on innovation and bioenergy in the UK, Levidow and Papaioannou
(2013) consider links between imaginaries and speciﬁc innovation
pathways. Their major imaginaries include ‘oil substitution’, in which
fuels resulting in lower carbon emissions replace oil; electric cars,
hydrogen fuels cells and biofuels are among the pathways considered.
This evolution and competition highlight how visions must be credible,
not only desirable, if they are to be successful imaginaries. Berkhout
(2006) suggests effective visions achieve the right balance between
utopia (desirable) and realism (plausible) through realistic strategies and
tactics, and are – at least potentially – open to new entrants. It follows
that a sociotechnical imaginary of a future in which automobility remains
dominant, but with low carbon vehicles, cannot be easily reduced to
either ‘desirable’ or ‘plausible’.
2.2. Imagining users and behaviour
Visioning documents make various assumptions about the future and
about the nature and behaviour of users of innovations. In the context of
sustainable development, and especially when rapid technological
change is required, “technology promoters have much to gain by having
‘the public’ on-side rather than resistant to innovation” (Walker et al.,
2010, p. 931). While public engagement is an option, in technology,
industry and policy circles an imagined public is also invoked, with pre-
sumed voice and subjectivity (Burningham et al., 2007; Walker et al.,
2010), i.e., decisions are made with an imagined public response in mind.
How the public are imagined can signiﬁcantly shape innovation trajec-
tories in visioning exercises. For example, if purchase is key, people
might be imagined primarily as consumers (Burningham et al., 2007;
Walker et al., 2010).
In the transport context, imagined publics tend to be portrayed as
‘universal individuals’ (Skinner et al., 2007), sometimes segmented into a
number of groups (of interchangeable individuals). This is in line with
reviews of transport models and philosophy (Timms, 2008; Banister
et al., 2011), which suggests that for the past several decades transport
modelling has been dominated by methodological individualism, focusing
on representation of people as rationally acting individuals. This
approach states that society can be fully explained in terms of the actions
of individual actors, where “systems are little more than the sum of their
parts and that their dynamics are reducible to accounts of the behaviour
of their constituents” (Banister et al., 2011, p. 260), with the consequence
that “system dynamics equal aggregations of the behaviour of lower-level
units within systems” (Banister et al., 2011). This approach and has long
been criticised for ignoring structural and cultural constraints (e.g.,
Dowding and Hindmoor, 1997). Furthermore, despite decades of aca-
demic research on the close linkages between travel, time use and
longer-term decisions about residential location and car ownership
within households and over individuals' life-course, transport behaviour
remains widely imagined in the realms of policy, industry and the media
as a collection of independent choices made by individuals, from daily
travel to car purchase (Doughty and Murray, 2014).
A key question about the future of personal mobility is whether it is
with or without personal vehicles (Stephenson et al., 2014). Much aca-
demic literature assumes that private car ownership will remain impor-
tant and that ULEVs (ultra-low emission vehicles) will be of key
importance in reducing transport's greenhouse gas emissions. A large
number of studies have therefore focused on how consumers' purchase of
alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs) can contribute to reduced emissions (e.g.,
Mabit and Fosgerau, 2011; Sierzchula et al., 2014; Braz da Silva and
Moura, 2016; Hackbarth and Madlener, 2016). In studies of this kind
publics tend to be imagined as rational consumers.
This framing can also be found beyond academia, for instance in
government, industry and the media. A study of how electric vehicles
(EVs) have been portrayed in Finland (Temmes et al., 2013) found that
among actors in government, industry and the media an economic
discourse dominated over ideas of social embedding. EVs were con-
structed either as a business as usual option or from a rational consumer
perspective. Similarly, the representatives from government, the auto-
mobile and energy industries, NGOs and interest groups in Norway who
participated in Ryghaug and Toftaker (2016) study understood users
mainly as rational consumers concerned with cost. However, ‘range
anxiety’was also believed to be a major concern, but seen as an irrational
fear, a psychological barrier that would disappear with experience. Such
tensions between assumptions about behaviour highlight the need to
unpack how users and behaviour are imagined in visions.
3. Research design
The discussion above indicates that many assumptions about the
public and its behaviour are being made in visions of the future of per-
sonal mobility, both in academic research and – crucially – in the realms
of policy and industry. Given that visions play a key role in innovation
processes, those assumptions can have potentially signiﬁcant effects on
transition dynamics. This is particularly so when visions coalesce into
sociotechnical imaginaries and when, as the multilevel perspective on
sustainability transitions (e.g., Geels, 2012) suggested, innovations
originating in protected niches are scaled up to durably reconﬁgure the
prevailing system of automobility. Put another way, a niche is not
necessarily a marginal innovation, but one with emergent or trans-
formative potential.
While a few studies have begun to unpack the assumptions under-
girding visions of the future of personal mobility, there is a need for
further analysis. Research should systematically examine how the public,
behaviour and mobility and their interrelations are imagined in future
visions. Comparative research that considers different innovations – not
only electric vehicles – and visions produced by different stakeholders in
a speciﬁc territory over an extended period of time can be particularly
effective in this regard. Our analysis for the UK seeks to provide that
systematic and comparative perspective, by focusing on the two in-
novations discussed – EVs and car clubs. This section details our docu-
ment selection and analytical approach.
3.1. Document selection and content analysis
We look at visioning documents prepared by, and on behalf of, a
range of stakeholders in the UK transport sector, including government,
industry, consultancies and transport coalitions. We chose documents
published in 2002–2015, a period which saw a rise in the perceived need
for low carbon transport (Banister et al., 2011) and a certain hype over
EVs (and hydrogen-fuelled vehicles) (Geels, 2012). We selected docu-
ments that explicitly discussed EVs or car clubs, even if this was not their
main focus, and contained projections about the mid-term future (2020s
through 2050s), a period long enough for a socio-technical transition in
personal mobility to unfold (Geels, 2012), and a time horizon with great
emission reduction targets. We identiﬁed approximately 40 relevant
documents through searches of the websites of well-known organisations
(DECC, RAC, CarPlus, etc.), references in documents and academic
journals, and suggestions from colleagues. We found far more documents
that discussed EVs' role in the future than car clubs', with technological
innovation a very common theme in future transport discussions, and EVs
among the most commonly discussed technologies. This search is un-
likely to have been exhaustive but gave a wide enough range of per-
spectives for analysis.
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After initial screening, the set of documents was reduced to a more
manageable 20, listed in Table 1. We believe these sufﬁciently cover the
range of political, technological, economic and behavioural assumptions
and perspectives found in identiﬁed documents without too much
repetition, andwhich were suited to in-depth textual analysis. We tried to
choose themost useful documents from different bodies. For example, we
used a report (Straw and Rowney, 2013) by the Institute for Public Policy
Research (IPPR), which focuses on whether the UK can become a leader
in manufacture and domestic use of ULEVs, with the main thrust on
plug-in vehicles, including EVs. We rejected an earlier (2011) report by
IPPR on decarbonising road transport, as it had less original material to
offer. When choosing documents from the Committee for Climate Change
(CCC), we found the 2010 and 2013 documents different enough for
interesting analysis, but did not select reports published in between.
Finally, some documents did not sufﬁciently discuss imagined futures.
For example, the Enevate project (see www.enevate.com) focused on
accelerated introduction of electric mobility, including use of EVs in car
clubs. However, the multi-national project had a limited focus on the UK,
and its reports focused on the pilot programmes it launched, without a
clear vision of the future.
In total, three documents focus explicitly on EVs and four on car clubs.
The majority focus on low emission vehicles, the transport sector as a
whole, or on energy futures of the UK economy. These wider studies
address technological innovation, including EVs, much more than non-
technological change, portraying low-carbon vehicles as the main route
to transport emissions reduction; only a few mention car clubs, usually
grouped with behaviour change as complementary action. This shaped
our research, leading to a main focus on EVs, with car clubs offering a
counterpoint by highlighting the agendas and assumptions of the EV-
focused visions.
The documents we used also show a variety of methodologies and
approaches. Several held workshops, consultations, interviews or similar
stakeholder engagements (documents 1, 5, 9, 10, 12, 19, 20 in Table 1).
The stakeholders most engaged were from the automotive industry, with
government, energy sector, trade associations and other (mostly incum-
bent) actors also engaged. Fewer studies engaged with consumers,
although two relied on surveys of users or consumers (3, 11). Some
documents focused on reviewing and analysing previous research (7, 8,
12, 13, 18). Several studies involve quantitative modelling exercises (2,
3, 6, 11, 15). Others focus on constructing plausible scenarios under
different assumptions (16, 19, 20).
3.2. Hybrid coding
Our analysis consists of a ‘hybrid’ coding approach. It combines a
priori coding, focused on perceived drivers and barrier for innovations,
assumptions about mobility and behaviours, policy recommendations,
and projections for the future, combined with a grounded approach,
where we looked for themes, narratives and frames (such as ‘techno-
logical neutrality’ and presumed continued car dependence) emerging
from the documents themselves.
We loosely follow the methods of Boyatzis (1998) in developing a
quality code. For example, in coding for barriers, we deﬁne a ‘barrier’ as
something which prevents or delays development or uptake of an inno-
vation, e.g., would lead to their being fewer electric vehicles on the road
at some point in the future. We then identify ‘barriers’ in the texts either
through explicit use of the word, or through indicators – descriptions of
political, infrastructural, economic, technical, cultural or behavioural
issues, which the text explicitly describes as causing possible delays or
reducing uptake, or preventing and slowing technical development. We
carefully exclude innovation issues which are not ‘barriers’, e.g., difﬁ-
culty in reducing the carbon intensity of the electric grid might reduce
the sustainability of EVs, but it is not a barrier to EVs, unless the text
explicitly describes this as an issue which might reduce the development
or uptake of EVs.
We primarily focus on quantitative content analysis, recording spe-
ciﬁc words, topics and issues in the text, e.g., listing explicit barriers
described in the texts and minimising interpretation (Neuman, 2005;
Neuendorf, 2002). However, some qualitative analysis is used, consid-
ering the tone and context of the texts to infer agendas and ideologies
underlying them (Newbold et al., 2002), for example, in how the public is
perceived or imagined – as active or passive users, stakeholders,
knowledge providers, etc. In this paper, we draw on this analysis to
explore how (and why) visions of the future imagine people, their
behaviour and personal mobility in general.
Table 1
Final sample of literature depicting future visions of transport in the UK.
document year produced by (& for) focus time horizon
1 Developing Car Clubs in Scotland (Ball, 2010) 2010 Richard Armitage for Transform
Scotland Trust
car clubs 2015 (& 2027)
2 Car-sharing in London – Vision 2020 (Frost and Sullivan, 2014) 2014 Frost & Sullivan for Zipcar 2020
3 A new approach to predict the market … carsharing systems:
Case study of London (Le Vine et al., 2014)
2014 Le Vine et al. (academic publication) no timeline
4 A Car Club Strategy for London (Car Club Coalition, 2015) 2015 (members of the) Car Club Coalition 2025
5 Scope for the Transport Sector to Switch to EVs and PHVs (BERR and DFT, 2008) 2008 Arup and Cenex for BERR and DfT EVs 2030
6 Market outlook to 2022 for BEVs and PHEVs (Hazeldine et al., 2009) 2009 AEA for CCC 2022
7 How to Avoid an Electric Shock: Electric cars: from hype to reality (Dings, 2009) 2009 Transport and Environment 2050
8 Market Delivery of Ultra-Low Carbon Vehicles in the UK (Lane, 2011) 2011 Ecolane for RAC Foundation ULEVs 2020, 2030
9 Leading the Charge: Can Britain develop a global
advantage in ULEVs? (Straw and Rowney, 2013)
2013 Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) 2030, 2050
10 Pathways to Future Vehicles: A 2020 Strategy (EST, 2002) 2002 EST (TransportAction) for UK Government road transport 2020
11 Passenger car market transformation model (EST, 2007) 2007 Element Energy and Ricardo Ltd for EST 2020
12 The King Review of low carbon cars: Part I (King, 2007) 2007 Julia King for UK Government 2030, 2050
13 The King Review of low carbon cars: Part II (King, 2008) 2008 Julia King for UK Government 2030, 2050
14 Powering Ahead: The future of low-carbon cars and fuels (Kay et al., 2013) 2013 Ricardo-AEA Ltd for
RAC Foundation & UKPIA
2050
15 Fourth Carbon Budget: Reducing emissions through the 2020s (CCC, 2010) 2010 CCC for UK Government UK economy 2023–27 (& 2050)
16 The Carbon Plan: Delivering our low carbon future (DECC, 2011) 2011 DECC for Parliament 2050
17 Fourth Carbon Budget Review: technical report (CCC, 2013) 2013 CCC for UK Government 2050
18 Meeting Carbon Budgets–2014 progress report to parliament (CCC, 2014) 2014 CCC report to Parliament 2027, 2030
19 Future Energy Scenarios: UK gas and electricity
transmission (National Grid, 2015)
2015 National Grid gas & electricity 2020,50
20 Intelligent Infrastructure Futures:
The Scenarios – Towards 2055 (Curry et al., 2006)
2006 Foresight Programme futures 2055
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4. Results
This section presents our results, starting from how people are
imagined in visions about the future of EVs, car clubs and transport more
widely. We then consider how human behaviour is interpreted and
modelled in those visions, and ﬁnally discuss the broader question of
imagined mobility and the narratives and agendas underlying
these visions.
4.1. Imagining people
Despite some variation across the examined documents, there were
strong similarities in how people tended to be imagined. First, in nearly
every vision people are constructed as independent individuals who
make their own choices. In other words, personal transport is considered
in terms of individual people – or households – and their attitudes, be-
haviours and choices. As discussed in Section 2.2, this type of method-
ologically individualist analysis prevails in transport modelling and
assumes nothing is lost in analysing transport through individuals over
collective approaches.
Second, in most of the documents people are imagined mainly as
users in the context of increased uptake of an innovation in the future.
There is some consideration of people as subjects whose behaviour af-
fects sustainability (primarily through uptake), but little thought of the
public as stakeholders, knowledge providers, or partners in shaping the
future. While many documents consulted stakeholders from business,
industry and elsewhere, only two (Le Vine et al., 2014; EST, 2007) used
primary research of people's opinions via user surveys. Only one docu-
ment (Lane, 2011) called for including user voices in the innovation
process, including an ULEV users' forum; yet even here the primary focus
remained on user uptake.
Third, many of the documents, especially those with a focus on EVs or
ULEVs more generally, imagine people as roughly identical, inter-
changeable users. When heterogeneity is acknowledged, it is usually in
the form of population segmentation (into groups of interchangeable
individuals) with calls to “address the differing priorities of the innovation
adoption segments” (BERR and DFT, 2008, p.58). These segments loosely
follow the sequential innovation diffusion model advanced by the likes of
Rogers (1995), in which the innovators and early adopters are those who
have already purchased EVs or joined car clubs, or are likely to do so
soon. This segmentation focuses on the order of adoption (with consid-
eration on how to support uptake for each segment) but not on hetero-
geneity of use or needs. Recent research on population segmentation
(e.g., Brand et al., 2017) emphasises heterogeneity more, highlighting
how EVs are more attractive to population sub-groups for reasons
including upfront and running costs, variety of car types and brands,
image and charging issues.
Several ULEV-focused documents show an explicit interest in serving
a heterogeneous public. This is done by suggesting that a broad range of
brands and models of EVs are required for different preferences and
needs (CCC, 2014); modelling a variety of (rational) consumers with
different preferences for vehicle attributes (EST, 2007); or using popu-
lation segmentation to identify potential for behaviour change and deﬁne
policies accordingly (King, 2008). However, the emphasis is on consumer
choice and the need for EVs to replace ICEVs through mirroring existing
choices and brand loyalty, rather than an analysis of different vehicles for
different needs. The underlying assumption is that “new technologies will
only succeed commercially if consumer expectations of range, comfort, safety
and speed continue to be met” (King, 2007, p.44). In this particular framing,
EVs need to mimic ICEVs and are to be sold as a technological substitute,
minimising required institutional, infrastructural and behavioural
change. This framing is premised on an implicit understanding of norms
and practices as ﬁxed and independent from technological artefacts,
whereas actually norms, practices and competencies change and
co-evolve with such artefacts (e.g., Shove, 2004). In other words, EVs
mimicking ICEVs is portrayed as the only plausible way for them to
succeed; but this portrayal is, in fact, limited and limiting. This framing
does not play to the strengths of EVs, which are forced to compete on
ICEVs' terms. Nor does it explore the full potential of electriﬁed transport,
which extends to a decentralised, smart grid with vehicle-to-grid ele-
ments, as well as electric bicycles, buses and mobility scooters.
Car club focused visions, notably, imagine a more heterogeneous
public. For example, one London study forecasts the potential car club
market by neighbourhood, considering income, education, age distri-
bution, population density, public transport accessibility and car
ownership per household (Frost and Sullivan, 2014). Another document
draws on a stated-choice survey to model a population with varying
parameters around ownership of car, bicycle or public transport seasonal
ticket, and strategies regarding joining a car club, as well as individual
journey choices (Le Vine et al., 2014). The need to invoke a more varied
public might be the result of framing car clubs as part of a wider, inte-
grated transport system, rather than a single, system solution; i.e., car
clubs are not the solution for all people, so envisioning a variety of so-
lutions for a heterogeneous population helps support their case.
4.2. Imagining behaviour
In the documents that have considered the behaviours of individuals,
adopters and users are constructed in narrow terms, with rational eco-
nomic actor models prevailing. In other words, people are primarily
imagined as consumers whose transport behaviour is a set of choices that
maximise their utility. It is also assumed that driving a car will remain the
norm. Even the most recent documents take little to no account of peak
car, which has been on the radar of the UK's Department for Transport
since 2005 (Noble, 2005) – predating the large majority of the ana-
lysed documents.
People's vehicle purchases are assumed to follow rational actor
models in most EV- and ULEV-focused documents, most prominently in
those written by or for Government. Speciﬁcally, there is a perceived
need to understand the low level of EV penetration when the theory
suggests purchasing an EV would be the rational choice. Low uptake is
most commonly interpreted as consumers weighing high upfront prices
of EVs over their low running costs, i.e., having ‘high discount rates’ on
vehicle purchase. Some documents call this behaviour ‘sub-optimal’
(King, 2008) or ‘myopic’ (CCC, 2010), or even suggest consumers need
education about whole life cost (BERR and DFT, 2008), as “people tend to
discount heavily (or not take into account) future cost savings from fuel
economy at the time of purchasing a car, even though it would seem to be in
their own interests as well as those of the environment” (King, 2007, p. 57).
This imagining has a ﬁnancial focus and comes with the assumption that
increased EV uptake can be achieved through shorter payback times or
reduced upfront costs. It induces a search for new business models:
government and industry are encouraged to develop and support battery
leasing and other new ﬁnancial arrangements to reduce upfront cost,
because these “better align the time proﬁle of costs and beneﬁts from electric
car purchase” (CCC, 2010, p. 165).
There is ample support in the academic literature for the idea that
ﬁnancial factors play an important part in the uptake of EVs (e.g. Tran
et al., 2002; Axsen et al., 2016). Evidence from Norway – global leader in
EV market share (IEA, 2016) – suggests that ﬁscal measures and direct
subsidies have been a critically important factor, but also that they are on
their own insufﬁcient to accelerate EV uptake (Figenbaum et al., 2015).
Stimulating EV diffusion requires a package of policy measures that
considers other sociotechnical and behavioural elements, which we will
touch upon later in this section.
On the other hand, two of the documents in our sample prepared by
the consultancy ﬁrm AEA explicitly mention that both car manufacturers
(Hazeldine et al., 2009) and recent research (Kay et al., 2013) suggest
consumer behaviour in vehicle purchase simply does not follow the
rational economic model, implying that reducing upfront costs does not
guarantee uptake. Nonetheless, they repeat the ‘heavy discounting’
argument, adding that consumers value minor beneﬁts that do not accrue
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signiﬁcant ﬁnancial savings; they do not offer alternative behaviour
theories for vehicle purchase. Another consultancy ﬁrm study (Lane,
2011), commissioned by automotive services company RAC, criticises
the focus on cost and fuel efﬁciency, highlighting how car symbolism
(status, identity, etc.) can override economic rationality.
Drawing on rational actor models, many documents analyse behav-
iour in terms of barriers and incentives to purchase. Common assump-
tions in the documents are that consumers lack knowledge or awareness
of EVs (or car clubs), or of their longer-term (ﬁnancial) beneﬁts, and that
they take time to respond to new technologies, being biased towards the
familiar. This leads to conclusions that increasing uptake requires
increasing public awareness through marketing and other interventions
(Car Club Coalition, 2015; CCC, 2014; Lane, 2011). In other words,
behaviour change can be achieved through ‘educating’ consumers (e.g.,
BERR and DFT, 2008), matching the idea of consumer engagement as
provision of information and addressing concerns (Barnett et al., 2012).
A salient example is the conundrum of how to respond to ‘range
anxiety’, people's fear of not being able to charge EVs frequently or
quickly enough. Vehicle range is a concernmentioned in nearly every EV-
focused vision, with more than two thirds discussing it in the context of
consumers' uptake of vehicles. There are broadly two responses: The ﬁrst
emphasises the need to increase battery range, often portrayed as a
necessary technological breakthrough if EVs are to succeed. The second
focuses on attitude and behaviour change, e.g., studies showing that fa-
miliarity with EVs and experience driving them reduces range anxiety.
Several of our more recent documents discuss how experience, including
driving an EV or other exposure, could reduce range anxiety or more
broadly address the technical bias barrier (Kay et al., 2013; Lane, 2011;
Straw and Rowney, 2013; CCC, 2014).
While our document sample is not exhaustive, our analysis suggests
that while barriers to EVs are seen as a combination of technical, infra-
structural, ﬁnancial and user-related, there is a possible shift in analysis
over time, with recent (post-2010) documents more focused on how to
increase consumers' uptake. For example, identifying the limited range of
models and brands of EVs as a barrier to uptake appears only in some
documents from 2010 onwards, suggesting increased conﬁdence in EV
technology, and a shift towards enabling a mass market. Lane (2011)
asserts that manufacturers are “rising to the challenge”, and suggests that
the technology is ready for mass commercialisation, leaving the real
challenge on the demand side. Moreover, while vehicle range is discussed
throughout, the phrase ‘range anxiety’, which problematises drivers and
passengers, only appears in documents written from 2013 onwards. Such
a shift might reﬂect increased conﬁdence in ULEV technologies, and EVs
in particular, and perhaps frustration about low uptake. The normative
language of meeting a challenge, problematising users, and focusing on
barriers to uptake suggests many documents see ULEV-dominated futures
as desirable, rather than (merely) plausible.
The separation of technological development from consumer behav-
iour and demand has been criticised for lacking the socio-technical
context in which technological innovation happens and neglecting
broader change in society, often leading to overly optimistic predictions
of ‘technical potential’ (e.g., Shove, 1998). It implies limited possibility
for systemic change, as visions of technologies developed around users'
current practices and behaviour, and consumers reacting only by buying
or rejecting new technologies, leave little room for alternative trajec-
tories, such as the full potential of EVs discussed in 4.1. This is a known
pitfall of future visions (Geels and Smit, 2000), which assumes social
practices are constant over time, when in fact they change, partly due to
emerging technologies. Such assumptions imply that keeping practices
(fairly) constant in the future is desirable; this matches the idea that for
incumbent powerful actors, systemic change is more difﬁcult.
As users' main role is seen as fairly passively adopting new technol-
ogies, it is not surprising that there is a focus in several EV or ULEV
focused documents on behaviour as a choice of which car they will buy, not
whether they buy a car or make other changes to mobility practices. Such
projections portray plausible futures, but crucially, they limit possible
futures to those with less systemic change. This matches arguments that
imaginings of the public as rational consumers prevail when purchase is
seen as key (Burningham et al., 2007; Walker et al., 2010). For example,
the National Grid study (National Grid, 2015) suggests an ambitious
society could adopt more environmentally friendly behaviours; but in
transport this is interpreted only as buying ‘greener’ cars. Documents
exploring EV penetration perpetuate this narrow behaviour focus: one
econometric model (EST, 2007) has consumer choice affect the per-
centage of different car types sold, while total annual sales and even
mileage per vehicle are held constant over time; another varies vehicle
types by scenario, but not vehicle numbers (EST, 2002); a third study
discusses average car journey lengths in the context of EV range, but not
modal shifts or changes to driving patterns (BERR and DFT, 2008). Other
behaviour change is also explored, for example through the Smarter
Choices policies (Cairns et al., 2004), which encourage rationalisation of
car trips (e.g. through switching to public transport). While emphasis and
projections vary, such behaviour change is for the most part presented as
marginal or complementary to the main (technological) shift, with sig-
niﬁcant change constructed as difﬁcult, uncertain, or with limited
impact. DECC (2011, p. 55) offer one example: “more people choosing to
take public transport, walk or cycle could mean up to a 5% reduction in urban
car trips. However, uncertainties around the impact of individual initiatives,
and barriers such as convenience, safety and appropriateness to journey, may
prevent the highest levels of abatement from being realised.”
Car clubs are seen as part of these ‘soft’ policies in some EV or ULEV
focused documents. However, a few car club focused documents (Frost
and Sullivan, 2014; Car Club Coalition, 2015) assume policy interven-
tion, such as raising public awareness, can lead to growth in car clubs and
a non-trivial reduction in car travel demand, with ‘car-light’ lifestyles:
“Car clubs will play an important role in reducing the need to have a car
because they offer an alternative to conventional car use models and can
reduce habitual car use while still enabling access to a car for essential jour-
neys” (Car Club Coalition, 2015, p.15). These documents focus on sys-
temic change, experience and habit; they portray ‘car-light’ futures as
desirable and plausible. This does not necessarily contradict the rational
actor approach if a broader focus is taken.
4.3. Imagining mobility
The above discussions show mobility imagined with a narrow rep-
resentation of behaviour change and choice, and of people in general. We
suggest that underlying this are powerful discourses that link mobility to
economic growth, with great faith in technological progress. Existing
patterns of mobility are seen as both an end in itself – a presumed need
and right to travel – and a necessity for continued economic growth.
Thus, most of the technologically focused documents imagine a desirable
future with an ongoing, car-centric, car-owning automobility, as “road
transport underpins our way of life” (King, 2007). Recent documents ignore
the emerging discourse of peak car and rather place themselves in a much
longer existing and more powerful discourse that sees jobs and economic
growth intimately linked with mobility, particularly road transport.
These links are most prominent in the King Reviews (King, 2007, 2008),
and also appear in other documents by or for government (CCC, 2010;
CCC, 2013; CCC, 2014; DECC, 2011), and in the work of consultancy ﬁrm
AEA (Hazeldine et al., 2009; Kay et al., 2013). This neoliberal under-
standing of the links between economy and car-centric mobility is
translated into visions of the future that can be deﬁned as business as
usual extrapolations of past trends and discourses. Despite this rhetoric,
the evidence for investment in transport infrastructure as a means of
economic growth is contested and the links are complex (Banister, 2012).
Technological progress is often seen as enabling continued high travel
demand and car use, and therefore economic growth, while ensuring
energy security and furthering sustainability goals. Such techno-
optimism is evident in the documents from statements such as “[t]ech-
nological progress has been fundamental to furthering the universal objectives
of growth and mobility” (King, 2007, p.8). The faith in technologymay also
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help to explain why only one document (National Grid, 2015) details
future scenarios where the UK's emission reduction targets, which are
often portrayed as challenging but achievable through a mix of ULEVs
and efﬁciency improvements to ICEVs, are explicitly missed. Powerful
actors in the transport sector have an interest in continuing current
trends of development, and this has long been a major barrier to shifting
towards ULEVs (Kemp et al., 2000). However, the climate change agenda
and emission reduction policies, and uncertainty about long-term oil
price developments, might now be strong enough for at least some
incumbent actors to consider a purely ICEV-based future untenable,
making the technological shift to ULEVs the option most suited to the
economic growth discourse.
The analysed documents suggest a shift over time as to which ULEV
technology is imagined as the most promising. The earliest document
(EST, 2002) is highly pessimistic about EVs and considers hydrogen to be
more promising. There is, however, more optimism later: 2009–2010
documents (Hazeldine et al., 2009; Dings, 2009; CCC, 2010) suggest EVs
have promise, with rollout depending only on price coming down,
although there is also acknowledgement of hype around EVs (Dings,
2009). Some newer visions suggest electriﬁcation of some sort is nearly
inevitable, with ULEVs here to stay (Lane, 2011; Straw and Rowney,
2013). This shift matches the growing hype over hybrids and EVs and
growing disappointment with (hydrogen) fuel cells and biofuels since
2005 (Geels, 2012), and with researchers arguing that the time is right
for electric mobility (Dijk et al., 2013) and that the automotive industry
has chosen EVs as the ‘winner’ among low carbon technologies (e.g.,
Bakker and Farla, 2015). Of the two auto-industry commissioned reports,
Ecolane, commissioned by RAC1 (Lane, 2011), suggests that manufac-
turers and technology are ready, and now it is all about consumer uptake,
whereas Ricardo-AEA, commissioned by RAC and UKPIA2 (Kay et al.,
2013), is the only recent report to still insist that a technology break-
through is needed if EVs are to reach the mass market. The shift over time
shows more documents seeing EV-centred futures as plausible, although
this seems to have to do as much with hype around EVs – and disap-
pointment with alternatives – as with technological progress of
electriﬁcation.
Despite different ideas of the technologies propelling the cars of the
future, we ﬁnd most visions imagine futures dominated by continued
automobility. This includes high demand for travel in a car-owning, car-
driving culture where technology supplies lower emissions, with limited
cultural or behavioural change and limited use of walking, cycling or
other non-car modes. Differences between visions are mostly about speed
of uptake and type(s) of ULEV that will ﬂourish, not whether motorised
transport is desirable. The consistency of these visions over time, and
between actors, suggests the existence of a sociotechnical imaginary
(Jasanoff and Kim, 2013; Jasanoff, 2015) of future mobility as an in-
cremental continuation of the present (and past).
Nonetheless, there are alternative discourses of sustainable mobility
that move away from techno-optimism and the equation of societal
wellbeing with economic growth, giving a much greater role to behav-
ioural change and a more ‘ﬂexible’ user. Such discourses enable systemic
change and non-technical innovation, including car clubs. Indeed, three
of the four car club-focused documents show elements of such discourse,
presenting a qualitatively different imagined mobility (Ball, 2010; Frost
and Sullivan, 2014; Car Club Coalition, 2015), with a more integrated,
service oriented transport system. They consider, and draw on, greater
changes in society, by suggesting the sharing economy could beneﬁt car
clubs; raising questions of equality, with clubs increasing car access for
non-owners; and stressing local beneﬁts of car clubs, including reduced
congestion and air pollution, and beneﬁts for local economies. These
visions assume society would beneﬁt from moving away from private car
ownership because reduced ownership will lead to lower car-based
mobility levels and increased use of integrated transport. Demand
reduction and modal shift are thus seen as integral to reducing emissions.
Nonetheless, while current levels of car ownership and travel are not
assumed necessary for sustained economic growth in those alternative
discourses, there is still an assumed need for access to mobility, and the
economic framings remain similar: a reliance on choice means a focus on
raising awareness in order to increase membership and overcome bar-
riers to adoption, with attachment to private cars and the difﬁculty of
behaviour change seen as the most signiﬁcant barriers.
Finally, we note that alternative narratives and approaches do exist,
as exempliﬁed by an important outlier among the collected documents,
the Foresight work (Curry et al., 2006). It builds scenarios around two
uncertainties: whether technological progress will deliver a low-carbon
transport system, and whether people will accept intelligent infrastruc-
ture. By exploring futures in which people reject technology, or in which
technology does not deliver its promised beneﬁts, this work offers an
alternative view to the prevalent techno-optimism in which people's
main role is the uptake of technology. Questioning the inevitable success
of economic growth and technology allows for fundamentally different
future scenarios, in which society, economy and transport patterns
change signiﬁcantly, with some scenarios portraying transport as greatly
reduced and mostly limited to the local scale; societal change means
mobility is no longer seen as a right. Such scenarios might seem
outlandish, but they help to expose the business as usual character of the
vast majority of imagined futures.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The analysis above supports four main conclusions about how people,
behaviour and mobility are imagined in visions of the future of personal
mobility in the UK. First, partly in line with previous work, the docu-
ments we analysed imagine the public primarily as individual consumers,
often framed as rational actors. Consideration is only given to the role of
“users” as individuals seeking to fulﬁl their transport needs by using
particular means of transport to get from A to B. Disregarded are other
potential roles through which innovations and transitions may be
advanced, ranging from the public as protagonists of sustainable life-
styles and political activists to producers of particular kinds of knowledge
and to tinkerers or experimenters with new technologies and institu-
tional arrangements.
The point here is not that this may or may not be an appropriate set of
assumptions, but rather that diversity and heterogeneity in the ways in
which citizens may be involved in innovation and transition processes is
not given due consideration. In other words, the imagined futures por-
trayed might be plausible, but they are only a subset of plausible futures,
constrained due to the dominant sociotechnical imaginary, and they
certainly fail to include the full range of desirable options. This imagining
might constrain, rather than further, diffusion of EVs and transition dy-
namics more generally.
Second, and following on from the rational actor framing, behaviour
change in the analysed documents is portrayed primarily in terms of
consumer choice, often limited to modal choice or even more narrowly to
vehicle purchase choice. Financial considerations are often seen to
dominate choice processes, even though there is ample acknowledge-
ment of ‘non-ﬁnancial barriers’, with solutions offered including provi-
sion of information and EV driving experience, and even a call for the
industry to engage in appropriate marketing. Again, we suggest that
rather than opening up behaviour change, this framing may work to limit
the many different ways in which user practices can change. There are
different possible explanations for this limiting behavioural narrative.
One possibility is the perceived difﬁculty in changing car-based transport
behaviour, making it politically easier to focus on technological inno-
vation than consider demand management (Potter, 2007), with ULEVs
seen as a “relatively painless form of behaviour change” (Marsden et al.,
2014, p.74) that will succeed with the right policies. A more radical
suggestion (Marsden et al., 2014) is that individual decision making and
1 RAC Limited is a British automotive services company.
2 United Kingdom Petroleum Industry Association.
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choice models dominate policy discourse not because decision-makers
have faith in their effectiveness, but because of a broader individualist
discourse and opposition to signiﬁcant behaviour change, which is seen
as conﬂicting with the perceived imperative of economic growth; this
would be in line with our next conclusion.
Third, we suggest the imagining of people as rational actors making
consumer choices is underpinned by traditional and, from a sustainability
perspective, problematic assumptions of strong links between economic
growth and personal transport, speciﬁcally continued high demand for
car use. Tensions are apparent between on the one hand, a preoccupation
with economic growth and the power of incumbent actors, with the
resultant narrowing of transport sustainability to emissions reduction,
and on the other hand a deeper sustainability agenda that favours sys-
temic change. To an extent, car club visions offer a counterpoint to the
dominant framing. They question one part of the dominant paradigm, the
link between car ownership and economic prosperity, and offer a vision
of a different transport system, possibly with lower travel, but with
mobility intact. This maintains people's right to travel and their access to
efﬁcient transport. At the same time, they are quick to suggest economic
advantages of their own visions, such as cost savings on transport
boosting smaller businesses and therefore local economies, and so remain
in keeping with the growth and progress paradigms. The implication
beyond the analysed documents is that the construction of future visions
transcends actors, being detached from any particular agent. Nonethe-
less, speciﬁc actors can subscribe to multiple sets of assumptions and
expectations simultaneously. For instance, some actors may subscribe to
‘new’ or ‘innovative’ transport platforms, while still subscribing to the
‘older’ types of master discourses and narratives. So, non-incumbent
actors still risk becoming captured or co-opted by incumbent frames
and discursive logics. The inverse can occur as well, with incumbent
actors subscribing to more radical and transformative imaginaries.
Fourth, and despite the complexities described above, there is an
element of determinism within such visions. The result comes close to
the dominance of a single sociotechnical imaginary and effectively
implies a fatalistic la pensee unique in which ‘there is no alternative’.
Some scholars have referred to this as ‘colonising the future’ or relying
on ‘selective remembrance’ by presenting a single vision as if it will
indeed become inevitable (Brown et al., 2000; Sovacool and Ramana,
2015). In this simplistic and static future, technological innovation –
here in the form of electric vehicles replacing ICEVs one for one – allows
a business as usual focus on economic growth by minimising the
environmental burdens such growth will cause, while ignoring some of
the broader possibilities and implications of electric mobility. Essential
to the construction of this imagining of the future is an understanding of
the public as a passive and undifferentiated actor performing the single
role of the consumer who rationally chooses to adopt and use the
technological innovation (cf. Walker et al., 2010). Any other role –
citizen, knowledge producer, etc. – would complicate and potentially
undermine the coming into being of the business as usual future. The
observations that car clubs carry less weight in the examined visioning
documents, and that the ‘peak car’ narrative is overlooked, also become
understandable in this perspective: they deviate from the status quo
preferred by powerful actors in the transport sector because they
challenge the techno-ﬁx and imply a transition pathway of reducing car
numbers (and sales).
A contrast to this approach can be found in New Zealand's Ministry of
Transport Future Demand project, which considered “How could or
should our transport system evolve in order to support mobility in the
future?” (Lyons, 2014, p.3). It recommends moving from predict and
provide to debating desired mobility futures and providing for them. The
report considers the possibility that peak demand has been achieved, and
suggests dealing with uncertainty through improving understanding of
changing demand patterns –with demandmodels ‘refreshed’ accordingly
(Lyons, 2014).
By contrast, the consequences of the UK fatalistic view of the future
are twofold. Not only does this framing help to reinforce currently
prevailing understandings of the relationships between economy, trans-
port, technology and environment; it also legitimises incumbency and
incremental change instead of genuinely empowering disruptive in-
novations and systemic change in the way that might be needed for a
sustainable transition (Schot and Geels, 2008; Kemp et al., 2007; Loor-
bach, 2010). In other words, visions of the future of automobility are, and
must be understood, as profoundly political and as conditioned by pre-
vailing power structures.
The analysis in this paper does not allow us to make strong, empiri-
cally grounded claims about the generative potential of visions of the
future of personal mobility in the UK context; we have not examined how
the visioning documents have inﬂuenced engineers, ﬁnance providers
and other stakeholders. We nonetheless observe a paradox: visions of
simple technological substitution do not play to the strengths of EVs and
– often unintentionally – perpetuate ownership and use of ICEVs as the
norm against which any other form of mobility has to compete. The
dominant sociotechnical imaginary may diminish the transformative
potential of the very vehicles it seeks to promote, by channelling re-
sources, interest and attention away from transition pathways, actors and
practices which are not centred on cars or individual ownership. Con-
structing visions of the future of mobility in which people, behaviours
and mobility are portrayed as more diverse and complex than users who
make a narrow range of rational choices and thereby contribute to
technology-driven economic growth, is not only possible but high-
ly desirable.
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